A notícia das detenções na imprensa britânica

Five organisers of unofficial referendum arrested in Macau

Detention of volunteers gives rise to fear over freedom of speech in former Portuguese colony
 

A view over Taipa, the lesser of Macau's two islands and home to many of the city's 33 casinos. Photograph: Press

The Guardian
August 25, 2014
 

Authorities in the semi-autonomous Chinese city Macau have detained five organisers of an unofficial political referendum, amid fears of tightening restrictions on freedom of speech in the former Portuguese colony.
Soon after organisers opened an unofficial seven-day "civil referendum" on Sunday morning, police shut down electric polling stations across the city. They detained five volunteers, including Jason Chao Teng-hei, the leader of Open Macau Society, one of the vote's organisers. Chao was charged with "serious disobedience with police" and referred for prosecution. All five volunteers have been released.
The referendum, which was inspired by a similar ballot organised by Hong Kong activists in June, asked Macau residents if they were satisfied with the rule of Fernando Chui, the territory's chief executive, and whether they would support universal suffrage in future elections.
Currently, the chief executive is elected by an elite committee of 400 people, most of whom are business-focused and loyal to Beijng. Chui, the son of a construction tycoon, will almost certainly be re-elected next Sunday for a second five-year term. He has called the ballot unlawful.
As of Monday evening about 5,700 of Macau's 600,000 residents had cast votes.
"It is inherently illegitimate for personal information to be collected and handled for the purpose of the so-called civil referendum," Yang Chongwei, deputy coordinator of the Office for Personal Data Protection, a government agency, said at a press conference following the arrests. The office had warned the organisers before the vote opened that the ballot violated the territory's privacy law, according to local media.
The ballot asked for participants' phone and ID card numbers to prevent fraudulent voting. "We had asked [voters'] permission first before we collected their identity cards and related information," Bill Chou, vice president of the New Macau Group, another ballot organiser, told Reuters. "There is no reason for the police and other law enforcers to intervene and to arrest our people in charge."
Like its neighbour Hong Kong, Macau is officially a part of China but enjoys a free press, an independent judiciary, and civil liberties unknown on the mainland. Yet critics say that these freedoms have been slowly eroding under pressure from Beijing. Earlier this month Bill Chou Kwok-Ping, an associate professor of political science at the University of Macau, said the university would not renew his contract because of his social activism. Chou was elected vice president of the New Macau Association, the territory's most prominent pro-democratic group, in June. The university denied that he was suspended for his beliefs.
Another professor in Macau, Eric Sautedé of the University of St Joseph, was sacked in June, also ostensibly for his political outspokenness.
Although Macau residents are generally considered less politically active than their Hong Kong counterparts, the territory has been gripped this summer by a wave of political activism. In May 20,000 people gathered to protest against a bill that would give the chief executive power over the courts – perhaps the territory's biggest protest since 1999, when it was handed back to Chinese rule. The following month 2,000 people gathered to mark the 25th anniversary of Beijing's 1989 crackdown on pro-democracy protesters in Tiananmen Square.

Polícia de Macau faz detenções no referendo pela democracia

A peça é do Público de hoje e noticia comportamentos das autoridades de Macau que vão na esteira de outras situações recentes de repressão da actividade de académicos locais. O território parece estar a trilhar caminhos sombrios; neste caso concreto, também com culpas históricas para Portugal, que, ao contrário do Reino Unido, não foi capaz de garantir que a Lei Básica de Macau previsse a evolução do seu sistema eleitoral para o sufrágio universal.

Duas leis parecidas, uma diferença básica

Two similar sets of laws, one basic difference

Frank Ching (*)
South China Morning Post
December 15, 2009

Following Portugal's Carnation Revolution of 1974, the new socialist government in Lisbon offered to return Macau to China but the offer was turned down. China knew that, if it took back Macau, there would be alarm in Hong Kong. The fates of Macau and Hong Kong were, and still are, very closely connected. In the end, China did not take Macau back until after the handover of Hong Kong from Britain.

Both Hong Kong and Macau were provided with a Basic Law by the National People's Congress. These mini-constitutions are largely similar, but with some significant differences. Each, for example, contains an Article 23 obliging the local government to enact laws prohibiting treason, secession, sedition and subversion against the central government.

With the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the Macau Special Administrative Region approaching on Sunday, a symposium was held in Beijing a week ago to mark the coming into effect of Macau's Basic Law.

Wu Bangguo, the NPC chairman, had words of praise for Macau that, to many, seemed like veiled criticism of Hong Kong. For one thing, he praised Macau's people because they "did not politicise conflicts and problems" and had properly handled relations between Macau and Beijing.

He also praised the patriotism of Macau's people and said they agreed that "Macau affairs are China's internal affairs" and they "resolutely oppose and resist interference by external forces". Furthermore, he said that the promulgation of Macau's state security law, in line with Article 23, had further strengthened local people's concept of nationhood.

He did not have to mention that Hong Kong has still not implemented Article 23 legislation after the fiasco in 2003, when half a million people marched to oppose the proposal.

No doubt, in Beijing's mind, many people in Hong Kong have not properly handled relations with the central government and so are not even allowed to travel to the mainland. They have also invited "interference by external forces" and politicised "conflicts and problems".

Of course, Chinese officials denied that the words were directed at Hong Kong. Li Gang, a deputy director of the central government's liaison office in Hong Kong, rejected the idea that Wu's remarks were actually criticism of Hong Kong.

Nonetheless, many Hong Kong politicians - and, no doubt, government officials - are interpreting Wu's remarks as pressure on the former British colony to implement Article 23. If this does not happen in the remaining years of Chief Executive Donald Tsang Yam-kuen's term, no doubt the next chief executive will see it as one of his primary missions.

There are other striking differences between the Macau Basic Law and that of Hong Kong. For one thing, while Hong Kong's legislature is technically fully elected, albeit in various ways, Macau's has appointed members. The Macau Basic Law, speaking of the legislature, says simply: "The majority of its members shall be elected."

Unlike the Hong Kong Basic Law, which says the ultimate goal is the election of both the chief executive and all legislators by universal suffrage, the Macau Basic Law is silent on that point. Since China had two more years to ponder the provisions in the Macau Basic Law, it seems likely that they more accurately reflect Beijing's preferences.

The British lobbied hard for an elected legislature to be put first in the Joint Declaration, and then implemented in the Basic Law. The Portuguese, it seems, did not consider it important. The result is that Macau's much tamer population, which can probably be counted on to return chief executives and legislators acceptable to Beijing, have been denied such a right. Ironically, Hong Kong's much more assertive population is demanding such a right, and Beijing clearly does not feel comfortable about granting it.

(*) Frank Ching is a Hong Kong-based writer and commentator.

RAEM, dez anos: palavras sóbrias de Louçã

A 14 de Dezembro de 1999, a Assembleia da República realizou uma sessão solene dedicada à transferência de administração de Macau. Por entre os habituais elogios de circunstância, destacaram-se as palavras sóbrias de Francisco Louçã.

A asfixia democrática

O texto é do Expresso do passado sábado, 12 do corrente. Refere-se a Portugal, mas bem que podia ter sido escrito para Macau, mutatis mutandis. Merece ser lido e reflectido.

Propostas para democratizar Hong Kong

Pan-democrats call for democratically-elected CE by 2012

South China Morning Post
September 7, 2009

The pan-democrats on Monday called for functional constituencies to be abolished and for a democratically elected legislature by 2012.

The call came after pan-democratic party lawmakers met on Monday afternoon to discuss the territory's future and renew their calls for more progress on the introduction of universal suffrage.

Former Executive and Legislative Councilor Allen Lee Peng-fei said the pan-democrats had also agreed on a lower nomination level for chief executive candidates.

He said the lawmakers wanted a new political model whereby anyone who got 50 nominations from the election committee - or who could get a significant level of public support - should be eligible to stand for the position of chief executive.

“It takes 50 to nominate as a candidate for chief executive — or you get 100,000 electors to nominate,” Lee told local radio.

Lee said the pan-democrats would like this model to be used for the 2012 election. But the former Liberal Party founding member said pan-democrats would “not resist too much” if this idea was not adopted until 2017.

The proposal includes keeping 60 seats in the Legislative Council, with half the lawmakers being elected from single-seat districts, and half under the current proportional list system. This would mean functional constituencies would be a thing of the past.

Chief Executive Donald Tsang Yam-Kuen is expected to begin discussions on constitutional reform later this year.

However, the government has said several times it would only discuss how the 2012 elections for chief executive and positions on the Legislative Council can be made more democratic. It has said it will leave proposals for full democratic voting in 2017 and 2020 to the next administration.

In Hong Kong, only 30 of the 60 Legco seats are directly elected by the people (through geographical constituencies), with the other 30 elected by 28 functional constituencies.

O costume...

É o costume: sejam a Birmânia, a Coreia do Norte, o Irão, o Sudão, o Zimbabué ou outro regime do mesmo calibre, o velho amigo nunca os deixa ficar mal. Tudo em nome da não ingerência nos assuntos internos de cada Estado, ou não fosse esse princípio tão caro - porque tão conveniente - ao próprio... Falamos disto, claro!

As necessárias reformas políticas (idem em Macau)

We must make progress on political reforms

Leader
South China Morning Post
August 04, 2009

The constitutional reform debate has often taken the form of a bitter political battle between pro-democracy forces and those loyal to Beijing. It has been portrayed by one camp as a grim fight for a fundamental human right and by the other as a potentially dangerous development that could undermine Hong Kong's stability and prosperity. These entrenched positions have resulted in little or no progress.

But there is another way of framing the debate, one that all reasonable Hongkongers should be able to agree on. Developing a more democratic system ought to be seen as a way of providing more efficient, effective and accountable governance.

Change is sorely needed. The 12 years of ups and downs since the handover have shown that the existing system simply does not work. The arrangements provided for by the Basic Law were out of date even when drafted two decades ago. They are not suited to the more politically active society that we live in today.

The law drafters envisaged an executive-led system - in other words, a strong government whose powers are, to a limited extent, checked by the Legislative Council. The reality, however, is that the executive has found it difficult to lead. It lacks the clear mandate that democratic elections would give it. The government also has no direct representation in Legco. The result is a reluctance to push ahead with any policy that attracts vocal opposition. Even simple plans that enjoy wide community support become bogged down in battles to win over minority interests. A series of U-turns and the shelving or delaying of controversial policies underlines the problem.

Legco, meanwhile, has the mandate from the electorate. But it is given no meaningful role in governance. Lawmakers are left with little choice but to act as an elected opposition. They have increasingly descended into the politics of protest. There is little co-ordination between the executive and the legislature - and opinion polls show the public lacks confidence in both.

This is not a healthy state of affairs. The public is also denied a real stake in the governance of our city. It cannot elect the government - or vote it out of office. People naturally turn to the only available means of registering their discontent - protests, legal actions and complaints aired through the media.

We are left with a dysfunctional and fragmented political system. It has led to inefficiency - in a city that prides itself on getting things done. Beijing has declared that universal suffrage can be introduced for the chief executive election in 2017 and for all lawmakers in 2020, which would fulfil the "ultimate goal" promised in the Basic Law. We must make the most of this opportunity.

It would be naive to think that democratic elections will solve all Hong Kong's problems. But a government elected on a platform of policies would be able to implement them with greater confidence. Giving that government representation in Legco - and lawmakers a role in government - would help forge a much stronger relationship between the two institutions. Scrapping the law that bans the chief executive from belonging to a political party would be a good start.

There are already signs that the familiar battle lines are being drawn for the consultation later this year on reforms for the 2012 polls. Every effort must be made to avoid another deadlock and, this time, to make progress.

Hong Kong cannot afford to continue with a dysfunctional political system much longer.

Um artigo de leitura obrigatória em Macau!

Singling out foreigners is an attack on Hong Kong

Stephen Vines

South China Morning Post
July 17, 2009

As the deadline approaches for the government to produce new constitutional reform proposals, the great minds in Lower Albert Road are busy coming up with 101 reasons for a delay while seeking new ways to explain that representative government will not work in Hong Kong. As they do so, an intriguing lifeline has been thrown to them by Cheng Jie , a mainland academic who was seconded by the National People's Congress Standing Committee to carry out research on the Basic Law.

In an article in the Hong Kong Journal, she concludes that "a great mistake of the Basic Law" was to allow foreign nationals to be civil servants and judges and that granting foreigners the right to vote has made the application of universal suffrage "more complicated".

Were this an isolated example of questioning fundamental characteristics of the Hong Kong way of life, it could be brushed aside. But it follows on from a more substantial attack delivered by Cao Erbao, director of the research section of the central government liaison office in Hong Kong, who openly called for the establishment of what is, in effect, a shadow government to ensure that Beijing's wishes are enforced here.

Professor Cheng's questioning of the Basic Law is less far reaching in some ways but more troubling in others. She is blind to Hong Kong's complex history of multiculturalism and conveniently ignores that most "foreigners" were born and bred here but hold foreign passports because they have reservations about coming under the rule of the People's Republic. Unlike foreigners born overseas, who have opted to be part of the life of Hong Kong, these "foreigners" feel the need for an insurance policy that allows them to opt out.

Presumably, Professor Cheng either does not know or chooses to ignore the fact that a high proportion of the government's favourite yes-men and women, who are regularly showered with honours and official posts, have foreign passports tucked in their back pockets. Clearly Beijing doesn't want to undermine their position, so it is reasonable to conclude that the real target of the professor's concerns are foreigners who are not Chinese. If this is so, it smacks of racism.

She is right to observe that Hong Kong's arrangements for foreign permanent residents are unusual, but not unique - permanent residents of Britain and New Zealand, for example, have the right to vote and many countries allow foreigners to become civil servants. But, Hong Kong goes further and derives strength from its multinational character.

In the case of the judiciary, marked out for special attention by Professor Cheng, the presence of foreign judges is taken as an indication that Hong Kong has nothing to fear from an independent judiciary matching the best international standards. And the fact that Hong Kong has granted all permanent residents the right to vote reflects a healthy desire to involve all the people.

Yet China is perpetually suspicious of what it regards as foreign intervention in its internal affairs and rarely misses an opportunity to express concern. The very internationalism that makes Hong Kong strong and viable as an international financial centre therefore becomes a source of suspicion in Beijing.

A small reflection of this paranoia was seen when Allan Zeman was apparently blocked from becoming a member of the Executive Council, despite having gone to the lengths of renouncing his Canadian citizenship and taking out a Chinese passport.

It is hard to confirm that a directive from Beijing caused this to happen, but there is no other feasible explanation. Although there was a lot of chatter at the time, it is surprising that this frontal attack on the chief executive's right to appoint his own officials attracted so little concern. Maybe that's because it was considered to be a small matter involving mere foreigners. If that is so, this only shows how undermining the position of foreigners has profound implications for Hong Kong.

Stephen Vines is a Hong Kong-based journalist and entrepreneur

Tudo bem... por agora

All's well and good in Macau ... for now



Frank Ching
South China Morning Post
July 14, 2009

In the 12 years since its return to Chinese sovereignty, Hong Kong has been rocked by many political earthquakes, such as the controversy over Article 23 legislation, which saw more than half a million people take to the streets in protest.

By contrast, Macau, which is marking the end of its first decade as a special administrative region, appears calm, almost tranquil. Its legislature passed Article 23 legislation without much public fuss earlier this year. And, later this month, a new chief executive, former culture minister Fernando Chui Sai-on, will be elected uncontested to succeed Edmund Ho Hau-wah.

Yet, this seeming disinterest in politics may be more apparent than real. A recent survey conducted by the Macau Inter-University Institute, sheds some interesting light. For one thing, it showed that 54.3 per cent of 1,120 respondents said they were not interested in politics, yet 51 per cent of them favoured election of the chief executive through universal suffrage. Currently, the chief executive, as in Hong Kong, is chosen by an election committee.

An additional 28 per cent favoured enlarging the Election Committee, which currently has 300 members. Only 15 per cent supported the status quo.

However, while Hong Kong has been promised that its chief executive can be chosen through universal suffrage in 2017, Macau has no similar timetable. In fact, while the Hong Kong Basic Law says that "the ultimate aim is the selection of the chief executive by universal suffrage", the Macau Basic Law is silent on this subject.

Similarly, while the Hong Kong Basic Law states unambiguously that the Legislative Council "shall be constituted by elections" and that the ultimate aim "is the election of all the members of the Legislative Council by universal suffrage", in Macau, there are no such provisions. In fact, only 12 of its 29 legislators are directly elected, with 10 others being chosen by functional constituencies. Seven are not elected at all but are appointed by the chief executive. And there is no provision in its Basic Law for abolishing appointed members.

This survey - the seventh "quality of life" report since 2007, covering the second quarter of this year - showed that 37 per cent of respondents considered there was an urgent need to have a majority of the seats directly elected while only 15 per cent said there was no need for political reform.

Furthermore, although the democratic rights of Macau residents are more limited, the turnout at legislative elections has been consistently higher than in Hong Kong.

In the latest survey, conducted in May, 66 per cent of respondents indicated their intention to vote in the upcoming legislative election in September, with 45.7 per cent voicing support for pro-democracy lists, compared to 25.1 per cent for representatives of traditional associations, 20.7 per cent for independents and 8.5 per cent for pro-gambling interests.

Asked for their views on a democratic government vis-a-vis an authoritarian one, 45.5 per cent supported democracy, while 22.5 per cent said authoritarianism may be necessary in certain circumstances.

One statistic that could go a long way to explain the attitude of Macau's residents is that 65.5 per cent of respondents - the highest ever score - said they were satisfied with their lives. This might account for so many people not being interested in politics. Yet, when asked for their political views, a majority voiced basic pro-democracy values.

This suggests that, if the economic situation should deteriorate and people's livelihoods were affected, the demand for democratic reform would manifest itself much more strongly. And because Macau's Basic Law does not provide a path to universal suffrage, there is no established channel for democratic aspirations, leading to the danger of pent-up frustrations. This is something that the next chief executive - and Beijing - would do well to keep in mind.

Frank Ching is a Hong Kong-based writer and commentator frank.ching@scmp.com

Progresso sem política (ou vice-versa...)

Macau progress leaves out politics

Muhammad Cohen
Asia Times Online (1)
July 3, 2009

MACAU - In the nearly 10 years since Portugal left the then-sleepy Macau, the former enclave has made stunning economic progress. As a special administrative region of the People's Republic of China, with a high degree of autonomy under the "one country-two systems" principle, Macau's per capita gross domestic product (GDP) has nearly tripled as billions of dollars of mainly foreign investment in new resorts has made it the world's leading gambling destination.

Amid this extraordinary advancement, Macau's political processes have regressed. After a decade of Macau people ruling Macau for the first time in 450 years, the city's apparent response is, "No, thank you," as the select few declare satisfaction withtheir lot even as the public at large are caught up in frustration and fear. Economic development has focused on the big players while Macau's majority get little but scraps, a pattern seen even more sharply in politics in this city of 550,000 people.

The local elite are circling their wagons, not on orders from Beijing but in response to dissatisfaction from both above and below. While it may protect them in the short run, it will leave Macau's leadership more isolated and vulnerable in the long run, ill-equipped to face the city's problems.

No contest

The most obvious sign of stunted political growth is the upcoming uncontested ascension of Fernando Chui Sai-on as Macau's new chief executive. When Edmund Ho was chosen for the post in 1999, he faced token opposition from businessman Stanley Au, which at least lent the small circle election a patina of choice. This time, support from democratic factions has been blamed for undermining the potential candidacy of chief prosecutor Ho Chio-meng, who chose not to run despite an early boost from a favorable article in a Chinese Communist Party publication.

Ten years after escaping colonialism, Macau can't even tolerate debate over who 300 of the city's great and good should choose as the new chief executive. Through an incredible coincidence or a series of backroom deals, exactly 254 people registered for the 254 places parceled out to representatives of seven functional constituencies (business, professional and civic groups), eliminating the need for a vote. The rest of the electors were chosen behind closed doors.

When I asked a cross-section of Macau professionals to comment on the chief executive election or the performance of the incumbent Edmund Ho, the overwhelming majority refused to speak on the record, sometimes offering extraordinarily creative excuses or simply admitting, as one did, "I have too much to lose."

Others agreed to speak on limited topics, declaring other subjects off-limits because, as one well-known Macau figure explained, "I'd have to be negative." Many people are afraid to express ideas. Uncontested elections amplify those fears, signaling that debate and disagreement are unwelcome.

After Chui announced his candidacy in May, an Internet campaign raised money to run a newspaper advertisement opposing a chief executive who, like Chui, comes from one of Macau's most powerful families. The bank involved abruptly closed the group's account. The ad eventually ran in a Hong Kong newspaper, after one Macau publication supposedly told the group, "We wouldn't run it for 10 million patacas [US$1.25 million]."

Inequality breeds discontent

Macau as a Portuguese colony never developed a political culture, and civil society has made little progress beyond the kai fong, traditional Chinese neighborhood associations. Two seats in the Legislative Assembly are held by members of the only declared pro-democracy party, which plans to split in two to increase its chances of winning more seats. Only 12 of the 29 legislature's seats are directly elected, with 10 chosen by functional constituencies representing business interests, and seven appointed by the chief executive, ensuring vested interested are in control.

Grassroots opposition to Macau's government tends to be ad hoc and lightly organized but discontent simmers close to the surface over the uneven benefits of Macau's economic growth.

May Day 2007 drew unprecedented crowds into the streets, protesting over imported labor. Panicked police fired warning shots close to the demonstrators, wounding a bystander. The incident drew international attention, and, along with the US$100 million corruption scandal involving former public works secretary Ao Man Long that began unfolding in late 2006, undermined Macau's position as Beijing's preferred special administrative region compared to larger, usually more unruly Hong Kong.

In the absence of other drivers, the incident remains the dominant event on Macau's political landscape, exerting influence across the spectrum.

For the past two years, the government's main objective has been to prevent a repeat of the mass demonstrations. Ahead of May Day 2008, it declared a 5,000 patacas payment for all permanent residents and upped the handout to 6,000 patacas this year. (In both years, non-permanent residents received half of the declared amount.) When the economic crisis began to bite late last year, the government did all it could to ensure the ax fell on foreign workers rather than locals. In some cases, professionals who'd lost their jobs and lived in Macau for years were required to leave within 48 hours to guarantee they left the local labor pool.

The government's focus on foreign workers is at best misguided in a city that, certainly in May 2007, enjoyed virtual full employment and rapidly expanding labor demand. Specifics are different now due to the global economic crisis and mainland visa restrictions that limit visits, but the underlying truth remains that Macau unemployment isn't due to imported labor but lack of suitable skills, including English-language ability and professional training.

Lack of appropriate labor undoubtedly impacts economic development across Macau, from small and medium-sized enterprises that can't find the help they need (or can't compete with casino wages to get it) to hospitality services that can't match what's available in other resort destinations. Those situations touch on wider issues and far bigger problems facing Macau, and none of them will be solved by indiscriminately distributing 6,000 patacas.

More money than sense

Macau's government literally has more money than it knows what to do with, and the city's lack of political dialogue means leadership has no reliable mechanism to consult the public to help craft policies. Cash giveaways are an admission that the government has no real policies to address pressing issues. The upcoming change of chief executive will put a leading figure from the current, lost administration in charge, a man many in Macau see as less competent and personable than the incumbent, with closer ties to the shocking corruption that's helped undermine the administration's legitimacy.

Lack of political development occasionally suits Beijing. The central government got anti-sedition provisions known as Article 23 added to the Basic Law in Macau with little fuss; in Hong Kong, 500,000 people marched against Article 23 and the government abandoned it. Passing Article 23 in Macau was expected to provide impetus for its reintroduction in Hong Kong, but Macau's uncontested elections and stifled dialogue are precisely what Hong Kong fears.

Overall, Beijing just wants Macau to run smoothly, a priority it shares with investors, particularly those from overseas who aren't part of Macau's ruling clans. Leisure expert Andy Nazarechuk, dean of the University of Nevada Las Vegas Singapore campus, once told me, "I thought Las Vegas was the only place where people would invest billions in a mega-resort." He didn't believe that any other jurisdiction could offer security to investors, including rule of law and public order, combined with business potential, to support that level of investment.

But now, visible from Nazarechuk's window in Singapore, the two most expensive casino resorts in the world are being built with a combined price tag approaching US$11 billion, while Macau is still seeking more than $10 billion to complete its transformation into the Las Vegas of Asia. Across the region, from Seoul to Saigon to Siam Reap, casinos resorts are being built to compete with Macau.

To remain the destination of choice in this rising international competition for visitors and capital, Macau must lose the trappings of a banana republic and become a modern, efficiently run city where all stakeholders work toward shared goals. Uncontested elections and stunted civil society are not a winning bet.

(1) Os destaques são, naturalmente, da minha responsabilidade.

Um de Julho em Hong Kong

Tens of thousands ignore heat to march for democracy

Agence France-Presse in Hong Kong
July 01, 2009

Tens of thousands of people took to the sweltering streets of Hong Kong on Wednesday for an annual pro-democracy march, as the city marked the 12th anniversary of its return to China.
Organisers said the major impetus for the turnout was a combination of dissatisfaction with the government's response to the economic slowdown, surging unemployment and delayed moves towards universal suffrage.

“The issues this year mirror those in 2003,” Lee Cheuk-yan, a march organiser and leading trade unionist, said.

“People are frustrated with a government which is unable to lead them through economic hardship and political crisis, although not to a point where they want the chief executive Donald Tsang to step down.”

The 2003 march was galvanised by an economic downturn, unpopular then-chief executive Tung Chee-hwa and controversy over the introduction of a proposed national security bill.

The show of people power saw the security legislation shelved and was a key factor in Tung's decision to resign the following year.

Opposition to the government, which is mainly driven by pro-democratic political parties, has grown as the latest global economic crisis has hit the financial and export hub hard.

The city fell into recession in the third quarter of last year and the government expects the economy to contract 5.5-6.5 per cent this year.

Democracy supporters were further buoyed by the record turnout of 150,000 at the candlelight vigil last month to mark the 20th anniversary of the bloody crackdown on protests in Beijing's Tiananmen Square.

Despite temperatures nudging 32 degrees Celsius (90 degrees Fahrenheit), many protesters gathered at Victoria Park in Causeway Bay more than an hour before the march, sporting umbrellas to protect them from the scorching sun.

Dennis Chan, 28, who joined the march for the third time, said: “We want to let the government know that this is not our government.”

Tommy Lam, 12, said: “Donald [Tsang] always changes his mind to make the Chinese government happy. But he does not think about our feelings.”

Simon Wong, a first-timer to the march, donned a t-shirt printed with the words “Donald Tsang Does Not Represent Me”.

“It was hard to explain why [I joined the march] but I felt I needed to be here,” the 22-year-old said.

The protesters sang the song “We Are Ready” and held banners to demand universal suffrage for the city's chief executive and legislature in 2012.

Beijing has said that universal suffrage would not come before 2017 at the earliest.

Among the crowd were also migrant workers who called to be included in the minimum wage legislation.

The protest coincides with celebrations for the 12th anniversary of the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, after the former British colony was returned to China in 1997.

A separate, smaller pro-Beijing parade took place earlier on Wednesday.

Marcha pela democracia

Há doze anos, estive lá, em Central, a acompanhar ao vivo as manifestações públicas associadas à transferência do exercício da soberania de Hong Kong para a República Popular da China. Volvidos todos estes anos, as preocupações dos habitantes da região vizinha em relação à sua muito mitigada democracia mantêm-se. Por isso, amanhã, dia de mais um aniversário do handover, a sua voz far-se-á ouvir novamente nas ruas. À atenção de Macau!

Beijing 'afraid' of big turnout for march

Fanny W.Y. Fung and Ambrose Leung
South China Morning Post
June 30, 2009

Beijing is alarmed about the expected high turnout at tomorrow's march for democracy, which it believes could undermine the authority of Chief Executive Donald Tsang Yam-kuen, the organisers say.

The central government's apparently growing concern comes as more groups, including civil service organisations, have decided to join the march.

At a press conference to mobilise supporters to join the protest, which will start at 3.30pm in Victoria Park, Democratic Party chairman Albert Ho Chun-yan said he felt Beijing officials were worried about the possible high turnout.

"They have been asking around. Just after I openly gave an estimation of 100,000 yesterday [on Sunday], I received a call today," he said, adding that the caller was a "middleman" close to the central government's liaison office. "This year is the 60th anniversary [of the establishment of the People's Republic of China]. They are afraid they will lose face if many people hit the streets."

Mr Ho said his party's district offices had received more calls than in past years from residents inquiring about transport arrangements. The party would arrange buses to transport participants living in remote areas, he said.

One protest organiser said that in recent days, researchers working for the central government had raised concerns about plans by civil service groups to join the march.

"Originally, Beijing tried to play down the turnout by saying the expected large crowd had diverse views. But since so many civil servants are also joining the march, it is starting to fear the implications on the credibility of Donald Tsang's governance," the organiser said.

A mainland researcher assigned by Beijing to gauge the situation in Hong Kong said the central government was concerned, and considered a January protest by the disciplined services and the recent threat of a police march as "destabilising" for Hong Kong society.

As well as several civil service unions affiliated with the Confederation of Trade Unions, which is organising the protest, two postal service unions plan to mobilise hundreds of workers to join the march.

"The government has led the way in exploitation of workers by outsourcing our positions. We have to stop this by marching," said Tse Tin-wing, chairman of the Rights Association of Hong Kong Post Contract Staff.

Legislator Cyd Ho Sau-lan said that as well as livelihood issues, the march was a platform for people to air their democratic aspirations.

"We call on citizens to come out and voice their demands for dual universal suffrage," Ms Ho said.

The Alliance of Lehman Brothers Victims and a group led by former Legislative Council hopeful Philip Li Koi-hop will also organise two separate marches from Victoria Park to the government headquarters tomorrow afternoon. Mr Li's group seeks reforms in the judiciary.

Chief Inspector William Leung Wing-tai of Hong Kong Island traffic police said the force estimated that a total of 90,000 people would join the three marches and it would deploy about 1,000 to 2,000 officers.

Day of action - major events on July 1

8am: Flag-raising ceremony, Golden Bauhinia Square, Wan Chai

8.30am: Government reception, Convention and Exhibition Centre

9.30am: Wan Chai residents' march against Hopewell Centre II development plan, Wu Chung House

10.30am: Parade to celebrate 12th anniversary of handover, Hong Kong Stadium

10.30am: "Pan-democratic parties can't represent me" march, Southorn Playground, Wan Chai

2.30pm: Alliance of Lehman Brothers Victims protest march, Victoria Park

3.30pm: March for democracy, Victoria Park

A podridão do sistema

Macau's Rotten Borough
The future of Hong Kong?

Wall Street Journal Asia (*)
June 12, 2009

When Hong Kong was returned to China in 1997, Beijing promised the territory that its "ultimate aim" would be to select Hong Kong's chief executive through "universal suffrage." Since then, the Hong Kong government has dragged its feet on pushing China to implement this promise. The territory's residents need only to look to nearby Macau to see what could happen if this democratic stall continues.

Macau's "election" for chief executive kicked off last month when Fernando Chui Sai-on, a former culture minister, announced his candidacy. The mainland's official Xinhua News Agency reported in May that the Chinese central government approved Mr. Chui's decision to resign as culture minister, clearing him to seek the chief executive position.

A few fringe candidates, including a practicioner of Chinese medicine and a casino card dealer also collected forms to register for the election, but they are not expected to get the 50 Election Committee nominations needed to become official. The only other politically viable candidate mentioned in the Macanese press is Ho Chio-meng, a prosecutor who recently handled a big graft scandal. Under Macau's election rules, Mr. Ho has until today to throw his hat in the ring. If he doesn't, it will be a one-horse race.

But regardless of the number of candidates, the process is not democratic. Under the territory's mini-constitution, the chief executive is chosen by the 300-member Electoral Committee composed of 24 Beijing appointees, six religious leaders, 16 legislators and 254 members chosen by "special sectors" that represent business interests.

The vote is rigged in favor of Beijing, like the rotten borough system of Great Britain in the 1800s. The 24 China-appointed members tend to vote in line with the wishes of their mainland bosses. The 16 legislators this year don't include either of Macau's two pro-democracy legislators, who are boycotting the vote, saying they will not help legitimize an undemocratic system. That leaves the 254 special-sector appointees, many of whom have business or family ties to Beijing. Macau's 559,846 people have no direct say.

It's hard to know what Macau's citizens think of all this, given that they have almost no public space in which to voice their opinions. Macau's press self-censors in part because a hefty portion of its advertising money comes from the government. The local blogosphere is lighting up with protest, but the territory's anti-defamation law, Article 23, which passed earlier this year, appears to be intimidating many to keep their protests confined to the relative anonymity of cyberspace.

Macau's economy is closely tied to China. The mainland provides the territory with food, water, energy and the flood of tourists it needs to keep its core industry -- gambling -- afloat. Macau's citizens, like Hong Kongers, were promised freedom of speech, association and religion when the territory was handed back to China in 1999.

But Macau wasn't promised one thing that Hong Kong was: universal suffrage. Macau's chief executive election suggests that China has no intention of experimenting with democracy if it isn't bound by law to do so. That is why it is so crucial that Hong Kong take advantage of its legal rights sooner rather than later.

(*) Os negritos são da minha responsabilidade.

Vídeo da vigília por Tiananmen em Hong Kong

Imagens que merecem o nosso respeito. Um povo - o de Hong Kong - que defende a sua liberdade e homenageia os que sofreram e morreram lutando por ela - os manifestantes de há vinte anos, em Pequim. Uma lição para todos nós.

Vigília por Tiananmen em Macau

Acima, a exposição de fotografias organizada no Largo de São Domingos para recordar o vigésimo aniversário dos trágicos acontecimentos de Tiananmen (a reportagem da TDM pode ser vista aqui).

Como de costume, o IACM reservou o Largo do Senado para as comemorações do Dia Mundial da Criança, apesar de este ter lugar no primeiro dia do mês. Nem sequer podem usar a desculpa de a data ter calhado numa segunda-feira, dia de trabalho, porque hoje também o era.

Assim, enquanto cerca de duzentas pessoas se juntavam em frente à igreja de São Domingos numa sentida vigília por aqueles que, há duas décadas, pagaram o preço mais alto na sua nobre luta por uma nação mais livre e justa (fotos abaixo), a curta distância, as criancinhas dançavam e cantavam noite dentro (!) num palco com música em alto som - uma instrumentalização bacoca e torpe de menores inocentes, num gesto de chocante desrespeito pela dor alheia. Não consegui deixar de sentir asco quando por lá passei!

Quem tiver interesse, poderá encontrar aqui o artigo que publiquei no jornal Ponto Final de 4 de Junho de 2004 sobre o 15.º aniversário de Tiananmen.

Nota: agradeço ao Bairro do Oriente a referência a esta posta na sua habitual crónica «Os blogues dos outros». Pode ser que, com maior divulgação desta indecente atitude do IACM (que cumpre ordens superiores, naturalmente), haja um pouco mais de bom-senso no futuro.

Tiananmen recordado em Hong Kong

Tiananmen, vinte anos de vergonha

Como o PC chinês mantém o poder

How Beijing kept its grip on power

Minxin Pei
Financial Times
June 2 2009

It is hard to miss the self-congratulatory mood in Beijing’s corridors of power these days. The Chinese Communist party was practically written off after its army crushed the pro-democracy movement in Tiananmen Square on June 4 1989. At home, it faced a shocked and resentful population. Internationally, it was isolated. The fall of communism in the former Soviet bloc further demoralised its members. A sense of impending doom permeated Beijing.

Twenty years later, things could hardly be more different. China is riding high as a new economic and geopolitical giant. The party’s rule has never felt more secure.

Chinese leaders appear to believe that they have discovered the magic formula for political survival: a one-party regime that embraces capitalism and globalisation. Abroad, the party’s success raises fears that it has established a viable new model for autocratic rule.

As the world commemorates the 20th anniversary of the Tiananmen tragedy, it is time to reflect on how the party has held on to power against seemingly impossible odds and whether the strategy it has pursued since Tiananmen will continue to sustain its political monopoly.

Clearly, the most important explanation for the party’s apparent resilience is its ability to deliver consistently high growth. However, largely through trial and error, the party has also developed a complementary and quite sophisticated political strategy to strengthen its power base.

A lesson taken from the Tiananmen debacle by the party’s leaders is that elite unity is critical to its survival. The political necessity of launching China’s economic reforms in the late 1970s required the party to form a grand alliance of liberals, technocrats and conservatives. But the liberals and the conservatives constantly clashed during the 1980s, over both the speed and direction of reform.

Disunity at the top sent out mixed signals to Chinese society and, during Tiananmen, paralysed the decision-making process. After Tiananmen, the party purged liberals from its top echelon and formed a technocratic/conservative coalition that has unleashed capitalism but suppressed democracy.

An additional lesson learnt from the party’s near-death experience in Tiananmen was that it must co-opt social elites to expand its base. The pro-democracy movement was led and organised by China’s intelligentsia and college students. The most effective strategy for preventing another Tiananmen, the party apparently reasoned, was to win over elite elements from Chinese society, thus depriving potential opposition of leadership and organisational capacity.

So in the post-Tiananmen era, the party courted the intelligentsia, professionals and entrepreneurs, showering them with perks and political status. The strategy has been so successful that today’s party consists mostly of well-educated bureaucrats, professionals and intellectuals.

Of course, when it comes to those daring to challenge its rule, the party is ruthless. But even in applying its repressive instruments it has learnt how to use them more efficiently. It targets a relatively small group of dissidents but no longer interferes with ordinary people’s private lives. In today’s China, open dissent is stifled but personal freedom flourishes.

On the surface, the collapse of the Soviet Union reduced China’s strategic value to the west. But after overcoming its initial shock, the party adroitly exploited the situation by using the turmoil in the former Soviet bloc to instil in the Chinese public the fear that any political change would bring national calamity. Rising Chinese nationalism, stoked by official propaganda, allowed the party to burnish its image as the defender of China’s national honour.

The wave of globalisation that followed the cold war offered another golden opportunity. Capitalising on the lure of the Chinese market, the party befriended the western business community. In turn, western businessmen found a natural partner in the Chinese Communist party, its name notwithstanding.

With any self-respecting multi­national rushing into the Middle Kingdom, those who refused to recognise the new reality risked being outcompeted. In China, they also found undreamt-of freedom in doing business: no demanding labour unions or strict environmental standards. Wittingly or otherwise, western business has become the most powerful advocate for engagement with China. Its endorsement, along with the pragmatic policy pursued by western governments, has lent a legitimising gloss to the party’s rule.

Ironically, this political strategy has worked so well that the party is now paying a price for its success. With the technocratic/conservative alliance at the top and the coalition of bureaucrats, professionals, intelligentsia and private businessmen in the middle, the party has evolved into a self-serving elite. Conspicuously, it has no base among the masses.

There is already a backlash against the party’s post-Tiananmen pro-elite policies, which have resulted in inadequate social services, rising inequality and growing tensions between the state and society. Externally, the alliance with western business is also fraying, as China’s bureaucratic capitalism – anchored by state-owned monopolies and mercantilist trade policies – begins to alienate the party’s (genuinely) capitalist friends.

So when the Chinese Communist party toasts its post-Tiananmen success, it should be under no illusion that the good times are here to stay.

The writer is the author of China’s Trapped Transition and a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington

Greve de fome para recordar Tiananmen

Students go hungry to remember June 4

Eva Wu
South China Morning Post
June 02, 2009

A small group of Hong Kong students yesterday began a hunger strike in support of the vindication of the 1989 protesters in Tiananmen Square.

Representatives of the Hong Kong Federation of Students began their protest in Times Square, Causeway Bay, at 4pm and expect to complete it at about 9am on Thursday.

Xiong Yan , who was one of the 21 most wanted student leaders in Tiananmen two decades ago, and the sons of Jens Galschiot, the Danish sculptor-activist who was denied entry to Hong Kong on Saturday, will appear in Times Square today to show their support for the students.

Galschiot had intended to join events to mark the 20th anniversary of the June 4 crackdown and repair his Pillar of Shame sculpture at the University of Hong Kong campus.

Students gathered outside the busy shopping mall clad in black T-shirts bearing the slogan "Freedom now" and wearing white headbands that read "Hunger strike, HKFS".

Federation secretary general Crystal Chow Ching said the strike was a continuation of the 1989 Beijing students' movement.

"Those demands raised against the government in 1989 have never been realised ... and democratic development has been delayed," Ms Chow said. "There are comments this year distorting the truth of June 4. We hope the HKFS's action can raise concern among young people and encourage them to dig out the truth."

Young people should remain critical about recent social developments on the mainland, Ms Chow said. Democratic Party lawmaker Lee Wing-tat appeared outside the shopping mall to back the students. "They did very well and I support them," he said.

The Hong Kong University Students' Union condemned the Hong Kong government for its "arbitrary and irrational decision" to bar Galschiot. Political censorship and blacklisting would undermine the city's autonomy and the "one country two systems" principle, it said.