Activistas de Hong Kong novamente barrados

Macau shuts door again as Hu hails security law
We were roughed up by security officers, HK activists say

Fanny W. Y. Fung and Fox Yi Hu in Macau and Ng Kang-chung
South China Morning Post
December 21, 2009

Three more Hong Kong activists were barred from Macau yesterday, where President Hu Jintao lauded the enactment of a controversial national security law and stressed the importance of harmony and stability.

Chui Pak-tai and Richard Tsoi Yiu-cheong, of the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements in China, said they had been roughed up by Macau security officers after arriving at the city's main ferry terminal in the morning and before being turned back to Hong Kong.

At the inauguration of the new Macau government yesterday, Hu said in a speech that the city's smooth passage of the security law, under Article 23 of the Basic Law, demonstrated strong commitment to protecting the national interest.

"The smooth completion of the legislation based on Article 23 of Macau's Basic Law early this year shows that the Macau government, the legislature and people of various sectors have a strong sense of responsibility to uphold national security and interest," he said at the Macau Dome.

Hu also praised Macau for its lack of political disputes. "United, people can move mountains," he said.

The president arrived in Macau on Saturday for a two-day trip to mark the 10th anniversary of the return to Chinese rule.

Yesterday, Hu took the unusual step in his speech of highlighting Hong Kong's role in the practising of the "one country two systems" policy. Some analysts said he was putting pressure on Hong Kong to follow Macau in enacting a national security law.

Hu delivered his speech as the three Hong Kong activists were denied entry, following two journalists and more than a dozen activists from the city who were turned away on Saturday.

Chui and Tsoi arrived at the ferry terminal with three other members from the alliance. They planned to petition the central government to release dissident Liu Xiaobo , who has been detained on the mainland since December last year for charges of inciting subversion.

After presenting their identity documents at the checkpoint, they were told they were not allowed to enter. They said they were detained for an hour. Chui said he was dragged, kicked and pushed to the ground.

"One officer kicked me in my private parts. ... I fell back six or seven feet away," he said. Tsoi, vice-chairman of the alliance, said: "After they attacked us, we requested to complain to their department. They just refused," he said.

The pair took a ferry back to Hong Kong. Their three companions, who were allowed to enter Macau, returned with them because they had planned to act together.

Youth Union chairman Kong Kwai-sang was also turned away by Macau, over security concerns. Kong, who was allowed to enter in October, yesterday planned to go to Macau for private meetings with lecturers from the University of Macau.

Dr Fernando Chui Sai-on, who was sworn in as Macau's new chief executive, said his government respected press freedom and that immigration officers had acted in accordance with the law.

A Hong Kong government spokesman said: "We respect the jurisdiction of other places in exercising immigration control in accordance with their rules and laws. We will not seek to interfere with the decisions of other immigration authorities in individual cases."

During the inauguration ceremony, which was attended by Hong Kong Chief Executive Donald Tsang Yam-kuen, Hu took two minutes of his 18-minute speech to stress the importance of the "one country two systems" policy to Hong Kong and Macau. He said that for the policy to advance, it would need the joint effort of the central government, Hong Kong and Macau.

In a speech in Hong Kong in 2007 to mark the 10th anniversary of the city's handover, the president did not mention Macau.

Democratic Party chairman Albert Ho Chun-yan said: "[Hu's words] are a clear order to the Hong Kong government. That this [legislating for national security] is the standard by which good governance is measured."

Dr James Sung Lap-kung, a political scientist at City University, agreed that Hu's remarks showed Beijing had taken it to heart that Hong Kong had not passed Article 23 legislation.

"But Beijing is well aware of the political situation in Hong Kong. Hu knows well that if he presses Tsang to enact the national security law here, it is asking Tsang to commit political suicide."

Secretary for Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Stephen Lam Sui-lung said the government had no plans to go ahead with national security legislation. He said the Hong Kong government's priority was consultation on the electoral reform proposals.

Executive Council convenor Leung Chun-ying said he did not see Hu's remarks as criticism against Hong Kong, but added that the city should attach importance to what Hu said.

The drafting of a national security law in Hong Kong was shelved in 2003 after half a million people took to the streets in protest against the bill. Critics said it could be abused to curb civil rights and freedoms.

The Hong Kong Foreign Correspondents' Club said the action taken by Macau yesterday was ominous. It said barring the journalists was an attack on press freedom and could damage relations between Hong Kong and Macau.

It said such actions were particularly distressing in the wake of Macau's enactment of national security legislation.

About 1,000 Macau residents staged a protest against corruption, a lack of democracy, excessive labour importation and other social problems.

The protesters, led by democratic legislators Antonio Ng Kuok-cheong, Au Kam-san and Chan Wai-chi, marched from North district to the government headquarters in Nam Van yesterday afternoon.

E se fosse hasteada uma bandeira de Taiwan?

(Ponto Final, 12 de Agosto de 2009)

Progresso sem política (ou vice-versa...)

Macau progress leaves out politics

Muhammad Cohen
Asia Times Online (1)
July 3, 2009

MACAU - In the nearly 10 years since Portugal left the then-sleepy Macau, the former enclave has made stunning economic progress. As a special administrative region of the People's Republic of China, with a high degree of autonomy under the "one country-two systems" principle, Macau's per capita gross domestic product (GDP) has nearly tripled as billions of dollars of mainly foreign investment in new resorts has made it the world's leading gambling destination.

Amid this extraordinary advancement, Macau's political processes have regressed. After a decade of Macau people ruling Macau for the first time in 450 years, the city's apparent response is, "No, thank you," as the select few declare satisfaction withtheir lot even as the public at large are caught up in frustration and fear. Economic development has focused on the big players while Macau's majority get little but scraps, a pattern seen even more sharply in politics in this city of 550,000 people.

The local elite are circling their wagons, not on orders from Beijing but in response to dissatisfaction from both above and below. While it may protect them in the short run, it will leave Macau's leadership more isolated and vulnerable in the long run, ill-equipped to face the city's problems.

No contest

The most obvious sign of stunted political growth is the upcoming uncontested ascension of Fernando Chui Sai-on as Macau's new chief executive. When Edmund Ho was chosen for the post in 1999, he faced token opposition from businessman Stanley Au, which at least lent the small circle election a patina of choice. This time, support from democratic factions has been blamed for undermining the potential candidacy of chief prosecutor Ho Chio-meng, who chose not to run despite an early boost from a favorable article in a Chinese Communist Party publication.

Ten years after escaping colonialism, Macau can't even tolerate debate over who 300 of the city's great and good should choose as the new chief executive. Through an incredible coincidence or a series of backroom deals, exactly 254 people registered for the 254 places parceled out to representatives of seven functional constituencies (business, professional and civic groups), eliminating the need for a vote. The rest of the electors were chosen behind closed doors.

When I asked a cross-section of Macau professionals to comment on the chief executive election or the performance of the incumbent Edmund Ho, the overwhelming majority refused to speak on the record, sometimes offering extraordinarily creative excuses or simply admitting, as one did, "I have too much to lose."

Others agreed to speak on limited topics, declaring other subjects off-limits because, as one well-known Macau figure explained, "I'd have to be negative." Many people are afraid to express ideas. Uncontested elections amplify those fears, signaling that debate and disagreement are unwelcome.

After Chui announced his candidacy in May, an Internet campaign raised money to run a newspaper advertisement opposing a chief executive who, like Chui, comes from one of Macau's most powerful families. The bank involved abruptly closed the group's account. The ad eventually ran in a Hong Kong newspaper, after one Macau publication supposedly told the group, "We wouldn't run it for 10 million patacas [US$1.25 million]."

Inequality breeds discontent

Macau as a Portuguese colony never developed a political culture, and civil society has made little progress beyond the kai fong, traditional Chinese neighborhood associations. Two seats in the Legislative Assembly are held by members of the only declared pro-democracy party, which plans to split in two to increase its chances of winning more seats. Only 12 of the 29 legislature's seats are directly elected, with 10 chosen by functional constituencies representing business interests, and seven appointed by the chief executive, ensuring vested interested are in control.

Grassroots opposition to Macau's government tends to be ad hoc and lightly organized but discontent simmers close to the surface over the uneven benefits of Macau's economic growth.

May Day 2007 drew unprecedented crowds into the streets, protesting over imported labor. Panicked police fired warning shots close to the demonstrators, wounding a bystander. The incident drew international attention, and, along with the US$100 million corruption scandal involving former public works secretary Ao Man Long that began unfolding in late 2006, undermined Macau's position as Beijing's preferred special administrative region compared to larger, usually more unruly Hong Kong.

In the absence of other drivers, the incident remains the dominant event on Macau's political landscape, exerting influence across the spectrum.

For the past two years, the government's main objective has been to prevent a repeat of the mass demonstrations. Ahead of May Day 2008, it declared a 5,000 patacas payment for all permanent residents and upped the handout to 6,000 patacas this year. (In both years, non-permanent residents received half of the declared amount.) When the economic crisis began to bite late last year, the government did all it could to ensure the ax fell on foreign workers rather than locals. In some cases, professionals who'd lost their jobs and lived in Macau for years were required to leave within 48 hours to guarantee they left the local labor pool.

The government's focus on foreign workers is at best misguided in a city that, certainly in May 2007, enjoyed virtual full employment and rapidly expanding labor demand. Specifics are different now due to the global economic crisis and mainland visa restrictions that limit visits, but the underlying truth remains that Macau unemployment isn't due to imported labor but lack of suitable skills, including English-language ability and professional training.

Lack of appropriate labor undoubtedly impacts economic development across Macau, from small and medium-sized enterprises that can't find the help they need (or can't compete with casino wages to get it) to hospitality services that can't match what's available in other resort destinations. Those situations touch on wider issues and far bigger problems facing Macau, and none of them will be solved by indiscriminately distributing 6,000 patacas.

More money than sense

Macau's government literally has more money than it knows what to do with, and the city's lack of political dialogue means leadership has no reliable mechanism to consult the public to help craft policies. Cash giveaways are an admission that the government has no real policies to address pressing issues. The upcoming change of chief executive will put a leading figure from the current, lost administration in charge, a man many in Macau see as less competent and personable than the incumbent, with closer ties to the shocking corruption that's helped undermine the administration's legitimacy.

Lack of political development occasionally suits Beijing. The central government got anti-sedition provisions known as Article 23 added to the Basic Law in Macau with little fuss; in Hong Kong, 500,000 people marched against Article 23 and the government abandoned it. Passing Article 23 in Macau was expected to provide impetus for its reintroduction in Hong Kong, but Macau's uncontested elections and stifled dialogue are precisely what Hong Kong fears.

Overall, Beijing just wants Macau to run smoothly, a priority it shares with investors, particularly those from overseas who aren't part of Macau's ruling clans. Leisure expert Andy Nazarechuk, dean of the University of Nevada Las Vegas Singapore campus, once told me, "I thought Las Vegas was the only place where people would invest billions in a mega-resort." He didn't believe that any other jurisdiction could offer security to investors, including rule of law and public order, combined with business potential, to support that level of investment.

But now, visible from Nazarechuk's window in Singapore, the two most expensive casino resorts in the world are being built with a combined price tag approaching US$11 billion, while Macau is still seeking more than $10 billion to complete its transformation into the Las Vegas of Asia. Across the region, from Seoul to Saigon to Siam Reap, casinos resorts are being built to compete with Macau.

To remain the destination of choice in this rising international competition for visitors and capital, Macau must lose the trappings of a banana republic and become a modern, efficiently run city where all stakeholders work toward shared goals. Uncontested elections and stunted civil society are not a winning bet.

(1) Os destaques são, naturalmente, da minha responsabilidade.

China aperta segredos de Estado

China to amend state secrets law, avoid Internet leaks

Xinhua
June 22, 2009

China's top legislature Monday reviewed for the first time a draft revision to the Law on Guarding State Secrets, underlining the cutoff of Internet or other public network access to the country's confidential information.

The draft revision was submitted to the ninth session of the Standing Committee of the 11th National People's Congress (NPC) for deliberation. It had been discussed and passed in April at an executive meeting of the State Council, the Cabinet.

Xia Yong, head of the National Administration for the Protection of State Secrets (NAPSS), said parts of the existing secrets law had become obsolete.

The current law took effect on May 1, 1989 (*).

"New situations and problems have emerged in guarding state secrets as the country's social and economic development advances rapidly, especially with the introduction and development of information technology and the application of e-government."

The materials to preserve and handle state secrets have changed from paper to acoustic, optical, electronic and magnetic forms, which created the need for corresponding policies, according to the official.

An investigation by the NPC found that the proportion of secret-leaking cases through the Internet accounted for more than 70 percent of the total.

The revision added issues including taking technical measures to protect networks where secret information was stored and fire walling computers or other storage devices containing secret information from public connections.

According to the draft revision, computers and storage devices containing confidential information would not be allowed to be connected to Internet and other public network services.

In cases where no protective measures were adopted, confidential information would be banned from being transmitted through wired and wireless communications, Internet and other public information network services.

Some economic and social organizations' involvement with secrets and the mobility of personnel with access to classified information had increased the difficulty of guarding state secrets and called for improved management measures, said Xia.

The draft revision would minimize the number of people having access to state secrets and set up more scientific secret recognition, rating and termination procedures amid efforts to improve efficiency.

Statistics show the United States generates about 100,000 classified documents annually, while the number in China amounted to several million.

According to the existing law on guarding state secrets, state secrets refer to classified information concerning major policies and decisions of state affairs, national defense and activities of the armed forces, diplomatic activities, national economic and social development, science and technology, activities to safeguard state security and the investigation of crimes, and other items that are classified as state secrets by the state secret protection departments.

In 2004, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs declassified diplomatic documents compiled after the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, a pioneering move among government agencies.

In 2005, at a press conference jointly held by the Ministry of Civil Affairs and NAPSS, it was announced that death tolls in natural disasters and related information were no longer considered as state secrets.

Besides the draft revision to the Law on Guarding State Secrets, lawmakers will finish the discussion of a draft revision to the Law on Statistics, the amendments to the Law on State Compensation, and legislation on diplomatic agents and island protection during the NPC meeting, which runs from June 22 to 27.

(*) Durante os protestos de Tiananmen.

A podridão do sistema

Macau's Rotten Borough
The future of Hong Kong?

Wall Street Journal Asia (*)
June 12, 2009

When Hong Kong was returned to China in 1997, Beijing promised the territory that its "ultimate aim" would be to select Hong Kong's chief executive through "universal suffrage." Since then, the Hong Kong government has dragged its feet on pushing China to implement this promise. The territory's residents need only to look to nearby Macau to see what could happen if this democratic stall continues.

Macau's "election" for chief executive kicked off last month when Fernando Chui Sai-on, a former culture minister, announced his candidacy. The mainland's official Xinhua News Agency reported in May that the Chinese central government approved Mr. Chui's decision to resign as culture minister, clearing him to seek the chief executive position.

A few fringe candidates, including a practicioner of Chinese medicine and a casino card dealer also collected forms to register for the election, but they are not expected to get the 50 Election Committee nominations needed to become official. The only other politically viable candidate mentioned in the Macanese press is Ho Chio-meng, a prosecutor who recently handled a big graft scandal. Under Macau's election rules, Mr. Ho has until today to throw his hat in the ring. If he doesn't, it will be a one-horse race.

But regardless of the number of candidates, the process is not democratic. Under the territory's mini-constitution, the chief executive is chosen by the 300-member Electoral Committee composed of 24 Beijing appointees, six religious leaders, 16 legislators and 254 members chosen by "special sectors" that represent business interests.

The vote is rigged in favor of Beijing, like the rotten borough system of Great Britain in the 1800s. The 24 China-appointed members tend to vote in line with the wishes of their mainland bosses. The 16 legislators this year don't include either of Macau's two pro-democracy legislators, who are boycotting the vote, saying they will not help legitimize an undemocratic system. That leaves the 254 special-sector appointees, many of whom have business or family ties to Beijing. Macau's 559,846 people have no direct say.

It's hard to know what Macau's citizens think of all this, given that they have almost no public space in which to voice their opinions. Macau's press self-censors in part because a hefty portion of its advertising money comes from the government. The local blogosphere is lighting up with protest, but the territory's anti-defamation law, Article 23, which passed earlier this year, appears to be intimidating many to keep their protests confined to the relative anonymity of cyberspace.

Macau's economy is closely tied to China. The mainland provides the territory with food, water, energy and the flood of tourists it needs to keep its core industry -- gambling -- afloat. Macau's citizens, like Hong Kongers, were promised freedom of speech, association and religion when the territory was handed back to China in 1999.

But Macau wasn't promised one thing that Hong Kong was: universal suffrage. Macau's chief executive election suggests that China has no intention of experimenting with democracy if it isn't bound by law to do so. That is why it is so crucial that Hong Kong take advantage of its legal rights sooner rather than later.

(*) Os negritos são da minha responsabilidade.

Macau mais perto de Pequim...

Macau moves one step closer to Beijing (*)

Antoaneta Bezlova
Inter Press Service
April 14, 2009

China’s entrepreneurial south has always been Chinese leaders’ favourite spot for conducting experiments. Ever since markets advocate Deng Xiaoping launched experimental economic zones in the country’s south in 1992, paving the way for China’s emergence as an export powerhouse, the industrious Pearl River Delta has established itself as the epitome of daring in this nominally communist country.

This time around the experiment taking place on the fringes of the Pearl River Delta - in the gambling enclave of Macau – has political dimensions. Earlier this year the former Portuguese colony, which returned to Chinese sovereignty in 1999, endorsed a controversial new security law that outlaws treason, secession and subversion against China’s central government.

"Macau is setting an example that other Chinese territories, including Taiwan, would be expected to follow," says Law Yuk-kai, director of the Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor. "They had room to stick with international standards for much longer but they have abandoned it. It is the beginning of the end for the ‘one country, two systems’."

The ingenious formula of ‘one country, two systems’ - coined yet again by Deng Xiaoping - had allowed the former colonial territories of Macau and Hong Kong to run separate capitalist systems even after their return to communist China, guaranteeing their freedoms for 50 years.

But now Macau appears to have surrendered its rights and voluntarily accepted that Beijing will set the standards for what could constitute a threat to its national security. Among others, the newly passed bill punishes "preparatory acts" of the three crimes of treason, secession and subversion - providing for sentences of up to 30 years.

"The passage of the law is done on Beijing’s advice," charges Law. "They [Beijing] saw an opportunity to break the weakest ring in the chain and they took it."

In neighbouring Hong Kong, an attempt to introduce the national security legislation in 2003 created a storm of protests. The marches of up to 500,000 people on Hong Kong streets led not only to shelving of the legislation but also to the dismissal a year later of largely unpopular chief executive Tung Chee-hwa.

By contrast, Macau saw no significant protests. After four months of public deliberation, the only questions raised about the bill were by democratic legislators. The law was adopted with ease and came into effect on the day after its publication in the Official Gazette last month.

Macau’s almost universal support for the bill may have created shockwaves outside but it has come as no surprise to observers. A survey by the Macau General Union of Neighbouring Associations, completed last year, found that 92 percent of the territory’s respondents are in favour of the security bill.

"Unlike Hong Kong, Macau is not a very international city and people are not much concerned with events outside of the territory," says Au Kam-san, one of the two members of Macau’s 29-member Legislative Assembly to vote against the controversial bill.

"Macau people like to think of themselves as patriotic and tend to believe that any disobedience towards the central government in Beijing means a betrayal to their patriotism," he says.

Unsurprisingly then, the implications of the law’s endorsement for greater China were lost on many Macau residents. The same survey found that some 65 percent of the polled did not know the details of the bill. Introducing the legislation, Macau authorities had promised to strike a balance between protecting national security and safeguarding residents’ rights.

Ip Honglei, the owner of a quant antique shop on one of the cobbled streets in Macau’s old city, appears genuinely supportive of the legislation. "This is a law intended to preserve stability and we have all benefited from stability," he says. "Macau has prospered and this is all thanks to the central government in Beijing."

Asked if he is worried that the law may infringe on his personal rights to protest or speak freely, Ip said, "The law is not for ordinary people complaining about their salaries." He continued, "It is for all kinds of trouble- makers that may want to abuse Macau’s freedoms to stir trouble for the central government."

Pro-democracy legislator Antonio Ng Kuok-cheong says the smooth passage of the bill was ensured by the fact that the majority of Macau lawmakers harbour deep loyalties to Beijing. "In Macau, not only the leaders are pro- Beijing," he says. "The whole society is pro-Beijing."

The success of a pro-Beijing political camp in the territory dates back to a successful rebellion it led against the Portuguese administration in 1967. Antonio Ng Kuok-cheong believes the sway of Beijing forces in Macau contributed to the retreat of all pro-Taiwan political cliques and the weakening of the Catholic Church, which became largely apolitical.

As a result, attempts this time around by the church and some university students to organise more detailed discussions of the security law and voice opposition were quickly squashed by the authorities.

For a majority of the population questions of consequence have paled in comparison to the economic fortunes that Macau has enjoyed over the last ten years. With Beijing’s blessing, Macau chief executive Edmund Ho has managed to transform a once quiescent enclave into the glitzy gambling capital of Asia.

(...)

"Beijing’s control in Macau is absolute," says Antonio Ng Kuok-cheong. "There is no need for this law in order to ensure loyalty to Beijing. The law is intended as an example for Hong Kong. Macau would be used as a pilot case for enforcing the security legislation in other places."

Observers say Beijing’s failure to push through the legislation in Hong Kong owes also to its British colonial legacy. When Britain exited Hong Kong in 1997 it bequeathed the foundations of a sound legal system and vibrant civil society. People from the legal establishment in Hong Kong, together with NGO activists, were among the most vocal to question the provisions of the national security bill when it was introduced in 2003.

"Portugal’s exit from Macau was very different. Regulations were lax and there was no civil society to speak of," says Au Kam-san. "When the Portuguese left Macau, people were hoping for a change and saw that change [in] Beijing. In Hong Kong people feared change."

"In Hong Kong the genie has been out of the bottle for a long time," agrees Law Yuk-kai. "I fear though that all the things that we have rejected in the past, but Macau has now accepted, will come back to haunt us. This law does not bode well for us."

(*) Os negritos e a edição do texto (supressão de um parágrafo) são da minha responsabilidade.

We should see Macau's decision over Article 23 as a warning

Alison Liu Ho-yan
South China Morning Post (*)
March 25, 2009

The Article 23 legislation has been passed in Macau and is now law.

Although I am not a Macau resident this is an issue that concerns me.

I believe it is important that we should never forget that moment on July 1, 2003, when 500,000 Hong Kong residents struck a blow for our city's freedom.

However, residents in our neighbouring SAR did not have the same reaction when it came to Article 23.

Honestly, I do not understand why most Macau residents have shown such indifference when it comes to freedom of speech in China.

I see the enactment of this legislation as a backward step in the development of democracy in Macau.

Hongkongers should look on this as a warning and a reminder that we should never take what we already have for granted.

Some pan-democrats have been denied entry to Macau. The explanations given by its government were unacceptable, and I believe the refusal of entry by the Macau authorities was connected to this new legislation.

Article 23 can be used to violate the right to freedom of speech; this freedom is a basic human right.

I am disappointed that Macau has [in effect] already lost his "special administration region" identity over such a short period of time.

Without liberty and the protection of human rights, it is no different from anywhere else in China. I am glad that most of us in Hong Kong are still aware of the importance of freedom.

If we lost this right, it would not only hinder normal cultural exchanges with other cities, it would also damage our society, affecting future generations.

Hong Kong has a special place in China, because of the freedoms we enjoy. This must never be compromised.

We must not easily surrender what we already have. If we back down in the face of pressure, the future of Hong Kong will be in jeopardy.

(*) Letter to the editor.

Fireworks finale for Macau's Ho

Augustine Tan
Asia Times Online (1)
March 20, 2009

HONG KONG - With little effort, Macau's chief executive Edmund Ho Hau Wah pushed through a bill to outlaw treason, sedition and subversion against China's central government, setting the ground for a massive fireworks display when he leaves office at the end of the year.

Not the annual international pyrotechnics competition in the late autumn that has made this former Portuguese backwater the fireworks capital of the world, but a rude awakening to the democratic challenges waiting outside its doors.

A hint of what's on the way came this past week with gentle queries from Britain and the European Commission on how Macau's new law will impact on future visits by European politicians.

The Macau response has not been made public. It has, however, thumped down hard on a handful of Hong Kong legislators and pro-democracy activists who tried to enter over the weekend.

The Hong Kong activists have every reason to be deeply concerned. The law that Ho pushed through - known in Macau and Hong Kong as legislation on "Article 23" of the Basic Laws - is mandated for both former colonial territories under the mini-constitutions underpinning their return to China under the "one country two systems" expedience which allows them to run separate capitalist systems.

An attempt to legislate on Article 23 in Hong Kong first in 2003 led to a firestorm of protests from around the world and contributed to 500,000 turning out to march for the dismissal of then chief executive Tung Chee-hwa. The bill was dropped. So was Tung, a year later.

It had been widely rumored for some time that Beijing wants Tung's successor, Donald Tsang Yam-kuen, to complete the task before he steps down in 2012. The general belief is that Tsang wants to convince Beijing to hold off indefinitely till the current financial tsunami blows over.

So it came as a big surprise when Macau's Special Administrative Region (SAR) government released a document in October for 40 days of public consultation, during which none other than the chief executive himself chaired all six public meetings.

In Hong Kong there were concerns that Beijing was using Ho to pressure Tsang to act. But in Macau the view is unanimous that the initiative has come from Ho himself. Those close to or sympathetic to Ho insist that he wants Article 23 to be the crowning piece of his highly successful 10-year stewardship of Macau.

That Ho has transformed Macau to almost beyond recognition is not in question. It is the gambling capital of the world, outstripping Las Vegas in takings from some 4,000 tables and 12,000 slot machines in 30 casinos, slightly more than half owned by tycoon Stanley Ho, and the remaining majors owned by Las Vegas Sands, Wynn Resorts and MGM, along with a son and daughter of Stanley Ho.

The wonders Edmund Ho has done to the Macau psyche is no piffling matter. Hardly anyone now feels inferior to the average Hong Kong visitor who is now as likely to be scouting around for a job as having a quick flutter on the "big-small" table.

If anyone has to be bowed and scraped to it is the mainlander. Unfortunately, the numbers of mainland visitors have diminished considerably in recent months. And this is where those keeping their distance from the chief executive have a different spin on the speed with which Article 23 was pushed through.

In this view, Beijing began to keep its distance from the chief executive soon after anti-corruption investigators started looking into the properties and bank accounts of the secretary for Transport and Public Works, Ao Man-long, 53. It did not take them very long to establish that corruption was extensive. Ao was subsequently jailed for a total of 27 years on 40 counts of money-laundering, abuse of power and other crimes involving no less than US$100 million.

Also in jail with him are his father, Ao Veng-kong, brother Ao Man-fu and sister-in-law Ao Chan Va-choi, and several of Macau's top businessmen. Ao's wife, Chan Meng Ieng, who has absconded and believed to be hiding in Britain, was jailed in abstentia for 23 years.

Most Macau people believe that the Aos were merely fall guys; that more powerful figures have not been touched. Ao himself said in court that any contract above US$1 million had to be approved by the chief executive. It was also noted during the trial that in some documents presented to the court various names had been blacked out.

Investigators have not recovered all the loot yet. The hunt for millions of dollars, Ao's wife and several accomplices is still going on. Investigations may yet touch people higher up the government.

This may explain what an academic described as "stomach-churning" patriotic language in the law which has no place in any legislation, least of all Article 23, which is already seen by pro-democracy activists as a political tool for Beijing to deal with them.

He was referring to the highly emotional preamble which talks about "love for the motherland and for Macau, in body and soul, which is the tradition of Macau people and which, since returning to the motherland, has been transformed into a driving force for building and developing Macau, and preparing the SAR for the mission of defending national security."

Was it mere coincidence that such an outlandish display of patriotism surfaced just when Beijing is moving in diametrically opposite directions to deal with the effects of the financial tsunami on Hong Kong and Macau?

For Hong Kong, Beijing has speeded up a relaxation of restrictions on Hong Kong financial dealers, allowing Shenzhen people to travel freely into the territory and speeding up road and rail links to Hong Kong.

For Macau, where construction of various casinos came to an abrupt halt, causing job losses by the thousands, Beijing compounded the misery by cutting off the inflow of mainlanders to the casinos.

If Edmund Ho read this as punishment for allowing corruption to run even more rampant than under Portuguese rule, he would have good reason to initiate Article 23 all on his own.

Macau officials have been quick to dismiss talk of Article 23 having a salutary effect on Hong Kong. This is too simplistic a view. Macau's adoption of legislation which has its origins in the suppression of student demonstrations in Tiananmen on June 4, 1989 - to be remembered for the 20th year successive year in less than three months' time - has grave implications for Hong Kong. This adoption will simply be the most important factor for Hong Kong to consider. If Macau can do it, so can Hong Kong; that will obviously be Beijing's line from now on.

The ease with which Ho took the Article 23 bill through the consultation process and the Legislative Assembly is simply breathtaking. To minimize coverage by the international media, no English translation was made.

The only notable criticism came from Amnesty International, whose deputy director for the Asia-Pacific, Roseanne Rife, said: "The proposed legislation introduces restrictive language already in place in the People's Republic of China, including broad provisions concerning 'state security' and 'state secrets' ... These are provisions the Chinese authorities have used to imprison many merely for exercising their rights to freedom of expression and association."

These include closed-door trials for "state secret" cases when the judge deems it necessary. The central government in Beijing will now determine if the material in dispute is a "state secret" or not.

Chinese authorities have detained many in China, including human-rights lawyers and journalists, for supposedly revealing information classified as "state secrets", including information that would be considered public in many countries.

Amnesty International has repeatedly urged the Chinese authorities to clearly and narrowly define "state secrets" so that these provisions cannot continue to be used to silence dissent and arbitrarily persecute human-rights defenders.

The preparation of treason, secession, or subversion against the central Beijing government are now (2) considered crimes in Macau and their inclusion in this legislation could limit freedom of expression and encourage self-censorship.

"This legislation jeopardizes the future direction of fundamental freedoms in Macau and the concept of 'one country, two systems', which could affect not only Macau but also neighboring Hong Kong," said Rife.

The organization called for more time for the consideration of this legislation to allow for the fullest possible public discussion. The organization also urged the Macau legislature to make sure the legislation protected the rights of individuals who peacefully exercised their rights to freedom of expression and association as well as other fundamental human rights.

Ho and his administration simply ignored this and other protests. Only the "crime" of "preparing" for sedition or theft of state secrets (2) was removed during the bill's passage through the legislature.

Hong Kong's pro-democracy activists are not about to stop. Making Ho pay for his audacity in pushing through Article 23 is only one aspect of their push into Macau. They want to arouse Macau people to fight for democracy, and see great opportunities in coming months.

There are several elections in the offing: a replacement for the chief executive, a new legislative assembly and a new electoral committee which will pick the next chief executive, all taking place in the second half of the year. Opportunities to teach the chief executive a lesson and to shake up Macau people abound.

Individually and in groups, the Hong Kong activists have tried to barge into Macau. Several, notably legislators "Long Hair" Leung Kwok-hung, trade unionist Lee Cheuk-yan and academic Johannes Chan have been turned back. A South China Morning Post photographer who had previously been allowed in has also been barred.

Macau authorities refuse to give any reason for barring entry. The activists, accusing Macau authorities of interfering with their "right to travel", demanded that Donald Tsang take up the issue with both Ho and the central government.

Beijing has adopted a hands-off attitude. This does not augur well for Ho who, until the corruption scandal broke, had been treated consistently by the central government as something of a "blue-eyed boy" among regional chiefs.

As Beijing increases its distance from Ho, Article 23 begins to look less and less like his crowning glory and more and more like a "crown of thorns". Some activists are even predicting that Macau will be rocked by a bigger scandal before Ho finally leaves office in December - and that this year's fireworks may yet be the hottest ever to hit Macau.

(1) Os negritos são da minha responsabilidade.

(2) Editado. O texto original estava errado aqui.

Ainda as repercussões de domingo passado

Diplomats voice fears over Macau entry row

Ambrose Leung
South China Morning Post
March 17, 2009

The row over Macau's denials of entry to Hongkongers has escalated to the international level, with foreign consulates expressing their concerns to the former enclave's government.

A day after five pan-democrats were barred while their colleagues were allowed in, the Civic Party has started a "one person, one e-mail" campaign to the Macau Immigration Department demanding the scrapping of what they called a blacklist.

Maria Castillo-Fernandez, head of the European Commission's Office in Hong Kong, said it had been following the cases and "expressed concerns" to the Macau government during a meeting last month.

Those concerns include whether the denial of entry for Hongkongers, as well as the passing of the Article 23 national security bill, would have any impact on future visits by European politicians who might be outspoken against China.

The British consulate also said it had raised concerns with the Macau government.

"Together with our EU partners, we have been following these exclusions in recent months closely," a consulate spokesman said.

"We raised the issue in a meeting with the Macau government on a separate subject last week."

A source in the pan-democratic camp said one western country's consulate had offered assistance after raising concerns about the issue several days ahead of a trip on Sunday which saw five activists, including legislators Leung Kwok-hung and Lee Cheuk-yan, denied entry. The rest of the 33-strong group were allowed in.

Mr Lee is to appeal to the International Trade Unions Confederation, which is expected to raise the matter with the International Labour Organisation, regarding disruptions in the normal exchange between unions in the two cities.

It is not the first time foreign governments have exerted pressure over the tightening of border controls in Hong Kong and Macau. During the Olympics torch relay in April last year, a diplomatic storm erupted after at least eight foreign nationals, including Danish sculptor Jens Galschiot and activists campaigning for Tibetan independence, were denied entry to Hong Kong.

But legislator Chan Kam-lam, of the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong, said foreign governments should not interfere in the affairs of Hong Kong and Macau.

"How many people does the United States turn away every day? Macau is not the business of foreigners," Mr Chan said.

A Hong Kong government source believed the situation was improving, as the number of pan-democrats who were denied entry to Macau was smaller than expected during the trip on Sunday.

A Macau security police spokesman had earlier cited an internal security law and said Macau had a right to deny entry to anyone who violated the law.

The Macau precedent

The Wall Street Journal Asia (*)
March 16, 2009

Macau is a tiny place, but like Hong Kong, another special administrative region of China, it can be a bellwether for how much freedom Beijing will tolerate within its own borders. With the passage of national security legislation last month, Macau's authorities have set a dangerous precedent for Hong Kong -- and a damning example of China's broader intolerance for basic civil liberties.

The issue at hand is Article 23, a section of Macau's mini-constitution that requires the legislature to enact a law to "to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People's Government, or theft of state secrets." Hong Kongers erupted into protest over Article 23 in 2003 and the government backed down. Macau's authorities waited until the furor passed and then late last month put the enabling legislation through the rubber-stamp parliament.

Beijing-appointed Chief Executive Edmund Ho, whose term expires this year, calls Article 23 a "constitutional responsibility." A more honest assessment would call Article 23 what it is -- a provision that protects a dictatorial government from criticism. According to the new law, Macau's citizens can now be prosecuted for possessing "state secrets." Hong Kong resident and journalist Ching Cheong, who worked in China, spent nearly three years in jail after a sham trial centered on such a "crime." It's now possible that journalists in Macau will face a similar threat.

Just as seriously, Macau's residents are also subject to prosecution for "sedition," or the act of inciting treason, secession and subversion. The law vaguely defines these activities as "public and direct incitement." Would posting a news story on the Internet on Tibet or the Falun Gong be considered sedition? How will Article 23 jibe with Macau's Article 27, which protects "freedom of speech, of the press and of publication; freedom of association, of assembly, of procession and of demonstration"?

The answer is that in a one-party state, it's the authorities who make the rules. Yesterday Macau immigration officials barred two Hong Kong legislators from entering Macau, along with three other democracy advocates. Earlier this month Macau also banned a former Hong Kong Bar Association president, Johannes Chan, from entering the territory, citing "internal security." Macau denies the rejections are related to Article 23, even though yesterday's group was traveling to Macau specifically to protest the law and Mr. Chan lobbied against Article 23 in Hong Kong.

Hong Kong lodged weak protests with Macau and China over both incidents, explaining in a press statement that Macau "has its own immigration control." Western democracies have been largely silent on the incidents and the passage of Article 23. The local U.S. consulate didn't even issue a statement. A spokesman told us that the Macau government conducted a "public consultation" on the law before it was passed. Forget that Macau isn't a real democracy and the Beijing-influenced legislature tweaked the bill only slightly in response to local concerns.

Macau doesn't boast as robust a democratic movement as Hong Kong enjoys. That's partly the fault of Macau's former Portuguese masters, who tried to hand the territory back to Beijing as early as 1974. It's also due to a limp press and the overwhelming influence China exerts over the territory's tiny economy. The Macau Article 23 precedent shows how fragile the protection of civil liberties is in today's China. Hong Kongers should beware.

(*) Os negritos são da minha responsabilidade.

O artigo 23 na TDM - última actualização

Videonotícias da TDM e programas da Rádio Macau sobre a regulamentação do artigo 23.º da Lei Básica:

• Debate na Rádio Macau em 8 de Novembro
• Telejornal de 8 de Novembro (debate da Rádio Macau) (*)
• Telejornal de 23 de Novembro (carta da ANMD) (*)
• Telejornal de 23 de Novembro (manifestação) (*)
• Telejornal de 24 de Novembro (Au Kam San na AL) (*)
• Telejornal de 27 de Novembro (debate do Hoje Macau) (*)
• Telejornal de 28 de Novembro (Associação dos Advogados) (*)
• Telejornal de 29 de Novembro (debate da ANMD) (*)
• Telejornal de 30 de Novembro (final da consulta pública) (*)
• Telejornal de 16 de Dezembro (versão final do Governo) (*)
• Telejornal de 16 de Dezembro (liberdade de informação) (*)
• Telejornal de 19 de Dezembro (entrada da proposta na AL) (*)
• Telejornal de 19 de Dezembro (deputados anti-democratas) (*)
• Telejornal de 20 de Dezembro (manifestação) (*)
• Telejornal de 20 de Dezembro (activistas barrados) (*)
• Telejornal de 5 de Janeiro de 2009 (votação da lei) (*)
• Telejornal de 9 de Janeiro (2ª Comissão Permanente da AL) (*)
• Telejornal de 12 de Janeiro (redução das penas) (*)
• Telejornal de 18 de Janeiro (associações em debate) (*)
• Telejornal de 20 de Janeiro (redução das penas) (*)
• Telejornal de 21 de Janeiro (carta da Amnistia Internac.) (*)
• Telejornal de 2 de Fevereiro (redução das penas)
• Telejornal de 17 de Fevereiro (assinado o parecer da AL)
• Telejornal de 25 de Fevereiro (aprovação na especialidade)

Com a menção da peça do telejornal de hoje sobre a aprovação na especialidade da «Lei relativa à Defesa da Segurança do Estado», dou por concluída esta rubrica, não sem antes aqui deixar a nota de que foi um dia cinzento para o "segundo sistema".

E, como se não bastasse a infeliz aprovação da proposta governamental com alterações mínimas face ao texto que deu entrada na Assembleia Legislativa em 19 de Dezembro passado, ainda tivemos que assistir àquela patética manifestação de idosos em frente ao edifício do poder legislativo local: autênticas marionetas, provavelmente desprovidas de qualquer noção do que estava em causa, para ali levadas não se sabe por quem e a troco de quê. Talvez um vale de trezentas patacas para celebrarem o décimo aniversário da implantação da RAEM...

(*) Infelizmente, a TDM parece ter já retirado estas peças do seu arquivo, aproveitando o espaço para inserir outras mais recentes. Receio, pois, que o mesmo venha a suceder às demais dentro de pouco tempo.

Entrevista ao Jornal Tribuna de Macau

Os constrangimentos de espaço pré-definidos para a habitual entrevista semanal do JTM obrigaram as minhas simpáticas interlocutoras Diana do Mar e Patrícia Neves (na última foto abaixo) a condensar a hora e meia de "seca" que lhes dei em três páginas da edição de hoje do matutino. O resultado final pode ser lido aqui, aqui e aqui (o sítio do JTM na Internet está protegido contra cópias, pelo que não me é possível fazer um "copy-paste" do texto para o blogue. Tenho que me contentar com estas capturas de ecrã).

A flexibilidade previsível do Governo

Isabel Castro
Ponto Final

2 de Fevereiro de 2009

Se não tivesse havido qualquer flexibilidade do Governo em relação à diminuição das molduras penais para os crimes mais gravosos previstos na lei de defesa da segurança do Estado, isso é que seria de espantar. É assim que o jurista Nuno Lima Bastos analisa a notícia que dá conta de que o Executivo terá cedido na nova proposta enviada à Assembleia.

Fez finca-pé durante o período de auscultação pública e na proposta que elaborou depois de ter ouvido a voz da população, mas cedeu às pressões do órgão legislativo. Segundo noticiou na passada semana a Rádio Macau, o Governo terá concordado em baixar a pena mínima prevista para os três crimes mais gravosos contemplados na lei de defesa da segurança do Estado.

Para Nuno Lima Bastos, jurista que não escondeu as suas críticas em relação ao processo de regulamentação do Artigo 23º, a atitude do Executivo, proponente do articulado, não constitui uma surpresa.

“Estaria mais surpreendido se tivesse havido inflexibilidade”, comentou Lima Bastos ao PONTO FINAL. “O Governo preferiu deixar esta questão para a sensibilidade da Assembleia Legislativa (AL). Podia tê-lo feito antes, mas entendeu de modo diferente. Mas sempre tive a impressão de que, no fim, iria acabar por prevalecer o entendimento”, analisou.

De acordo com a estação de rádio em língua portuguesa, a versão final do diploma a analisar pela AL deverá incluir algumas alterações, sendo que a que mais se destaca é a diminuição da pena mínima a aplicar aos crimes de traição à pátria, secessão do Estado e subversão contra o Governo Popular Central, fixada em 15 anos.

Recorde-se que desde o início do processo de auscultação que o limite mínimo foi considerado excessivo por vários críticos à proposta, por o considerarem excessivo. Alguns estabeleceram uma comparação com os crimes semelhantes contra a RAEM para sugerirem uma diminuição da moldura penal, lembrando ainda que a que foi proposta é superior à que se aplica para crimes como o homicídio.

Outros houve que defenderam o mesmo utilizando a China como exemplo: embora a pena máxima no Continente para este tipo de delitos seja a perpétua, a mínima é de dez anos de prisão, menos cinco do que a que se pretendia fazer valer em Macau. Este argumento foi amplamente utilizado pelos deputados à AL que não se mostraram convencidos com o conteúdo do articulado e, ao que parece, terá prevalecido em relação à intenção inicial do Executivo.

No site da Assembleia Legislativa ainda não está disponível a nova versão do articulado, que será hoje estudada pela comissão permanente responsável pela matéria. A reunião agendada para esta tarde conta com a presença de representantes do Governo, pelo que a secretária para a Administração e Justiça, Florinda Chan, deverá deslocar-se de novo ao edifício do Lago Nam Van.

Podia ser melhor

Nuno Lima Bastos diz compreender que, “em termos teóricos, os crimes contra o Estado sejam considerados mais graves do que os idênticos contra o território”, acrescentando que “se isto significa que 25 anos como pena máxima é adequado ou não, enquadra-se já no domínio da política penal”.

O jurista considera que, a confirmar-se a diminuição da pena mínima para dez anos, o futuro aplicador da lei poderá ter em consideração a gravidade das consequências dos crimes em causa – se houve perdas humanas ou não decorrentes dos actos praticados contra a segurança do Estado.

Assim sendo, perde parcialmente relevância o argumento que utilizava as penas previstas para os crimes contra a vida como ponto de referência em relação aos abrangidos pela proposta de lei de regulamentação do Artigo 23º da Lei Básica.

Não obstante entender que “estamos no bom caminho”, o jurista não deixa de lamentar que não se tenha feito mais para evitar alguns riscos. “Continuo a entender que os mecanismos de averiguação da subtracção de segredo de Estado ainda oferecem margem de risco”.

Lima Bastos precisa a apreensão que tem e que está relacionada com a declaração a obter junto do Governo Central, entidade que confirma se a matéria em causa em determinado processo é ou não segredo de Estado.

O jurista alerta para o facto de não haver meios para confirmar o conteúdo da certidão em causa e receia que possa indicar como segredo de Estado algo que, à prática dos factos, não era do conhecimento público como sendo informação dessa índole. “Na China tudo é considerado segredo de Estado em determinadas circunstâncias”, afirma ainda.

Também em relação ao crime de sedição o aperfeiçoamento feito poderia ter sido melhor. “Pode haver um efeito de auto-censura em Macau”, aponta.

À espera de Hong Kong

Pormenores legislativos à parte, o jurista afirma que continua “a ter receio das pressões políticas quando um dia a lei for aplicada em Macau”. Subscrevendo uma ideia defendida pelo deputado Ng Kuok Cheong, Nuno Lima Bastos estabelece o paralelismo com sistemas democráticos para defender que, por estas bandas, este tipo de legislação assume contornos mais preocupantes.

“Em regimes democráticos, o Governo acaba por ter mais cuidado neste tipo de processos porque, sendo eleito, está sujeito ao escrutínio popular. Se adoptar determinadas condutas, pode ser penalizado por elas nas eleições seguintes.” Ora, em Macau o caso é diferente. Não só o Chefe do Executivo não é eleito por sufrágio directo e universal, como este método de representação popular só se aplica à minoria dos deputados à Assembleia Legislativa.

Mas há mais. “Num território como Macau, que está sujeito a um Estado que é tudo menos democrático, é óbvio que estes receios têm razão de ser”. Apesar de tudo, ressalva Lima Bastos, “haverá alguma contenção na aplicação desta legislação para acalmar Hong Kong até esta avançar com a regulamentação do Artigo 23º”. Só depois é que se sentirão, entende, as verdadeiras consequências da vigência de uma lei como esta.

Obama e nós

Nuno Lima Bastos
Jornal Tribuna de Macau
22 de Janeiro de 2009

Há dois dias, quando me preparava para assistir pela televisão à tomada de posse do 44.º presidente dos Estados Unidos da América, senti que esse seria o tema inevitável da minha crónica desta semana. Por outro lado, ocorreu-me precisamente a mesma preocupação que o director do JTM expressou no início do seu editorial de ontem: neste momento, é quase impossível ser-se original quando se escreve sobre Barack Obama, tal tem sido a sua exposição mediática nos últimos tempos, em particular nos dois meses e meio que decorreram desde a retumbante vitória nas eleições presidenciais. Tanto que, quando uma conhecida jornalista do Público discorreu sobre o pesado fardo do sucessor de George W. Bush (em texto reproduzido no Ponto Final de ontem), logo choveram mensagens de leitores no sítio do jornal na Internet, acusando-a de mera reprodução do que diversas publicações internacionais haviam já recentemente escrito e apodando-a, por isso, de tradutora, em vez de profissional da imprensa.
Ainda assim, vamos encontrando, aqui e ali, algumas frases felizes marcadas pela originalidade. Uma delas veio de João Miguel Tavares, do Diário de Notícias, que comparou o novo líder norte-americano com os dirigentes políticos portugueses nestes termos: «isto é como olhar para o Ferrari da garagem do vizinho e só ter uns Renault 4L à disposição» (o artigo integral pode ser lido no JTM de ontem). Enquanto via e ouvia Barack Obama a discursar perante os seus compatriotas, também pensei nisso. Não nestes exactos termos, claro, mas confrontando a eloquência e elevação das palavras daquele homem com a postura e a linguagem da generalidade dos actores da cena política portuguesa. Que embaraçosa – até desmoralizante – diferença, Senhor!
Vai daí, estou a assistir ao telejornal da TDM de ontem, que abriu com a cerimónia de Washington, e o que me aparece a seguir àquelas imagens marcantes? A reportagem de mais uma reunião entre representantes do Governo de Macau e a Segunda Comissão Permanente da Assembleia Legislativa sobre a proposta de «Lei relativa à defesa da segurança do Estado», concluída com as declarações do inenarrável presidente da comissão. Renault 4L? Não, o meu primeiro carro foi um velhinho Renault 4 GTL e tenho muita consideração por aquele ícone da história automóvel europeia. O que temos aqui é bem pior, para mal dos nossos pecados!
Dizem que cada povo tem os dirigentes que merece. Os americanos, pelos vistos, levaram oito anos a perceber que mereciam melhor, mas chegaram lá – pelo menos, por agora (veremos se Obama estará à altura das expectativas, se é que alguém alguma vez poderá estar ao nível de tão elevada fasquia). E nós, nesta minúscula, mas prendada, parcela de terra? Não merecemos melhor do que isto?
Leio no Público que a China terá censurado partes do discurso inaugural de anteontem, nomeadamente as referências ao comunismo, quer na transmissão em directo, quer na tradução chinesa disponibilizada pelos seus media. Não querendo invocar situações retrógradas que estão na ordem do dia num país aqui perto, considero quase um crime de lesa-majestade alguém censurar uma prédica como aquela. Mas fizeram-no, porque o povo tem que ser protegido e não pode ouvir falar nas «alianças sólidas e convicções fortes» que foram tão importantes como as armas para enfrentar o fascismo e o comunismo. E o povo também não pode ser intoxicado com recados aos líderes mundiais «que procuram semear o conflito ou culpar o Ocidente pelos males da sua sociedade». Assim como não pode saber que «os que se agarram ao poder pela corrupção e engano e silenciamento dos dissidentes (...) estão no lado errado da história».
Nada disto pode ou deve o povo saber. Afinal, o que o povo quer não é apenas «participar num convívio, com uns beberetes», como ainda agora veio dizer um administrador da Fundação Macau para justificar os mais de cem milhões de patacas que o organismo pensa gastar em subsídios a «jantaradas» comemorativas do 60.º aniversário da implantação da República Popular da China e do 10.º aniversário do handover de Macau? Como dizia o meu amigo Emanuel Graça no Hoje Macau, «aqui a conversa é outra: pagam-se jantares comemorativos», não lançamentos de livros, exposições ou palestras.
Na sua caminhada vitoriosa rumo à Casa Branca, Barack Obama foi-nos habituando a gestos nobres e mensagens profundas. Ao ser solenemente empossado, declarou aos seus concidadãos que era chegada «a hora de reafirmar o nosso espírito de resistência, de escolher o melhor da nossa história, de carregar em frente essa oferta preciosa, essa nobre ideia, passada de geração em geração: a promessa de Deus de que todos os homens são iguais, todos são livres e todos merecem uma oportunidade para lutar pela sua completa felicidade». E concluiu: «que seja dito aos filhos dos nosso filhos que, quando fomos testados, recusámos que esta viagem terminasse, que não recuámos nem vacilámos; e com os olhos fixos no horizonte e a Graça de Deus sobre nós, levámos adiante a grande dádiva da liberdade e entregámo-la em segurança às futuras gerações».
Já o nosso Governo, quando se dirige aos seus concidadãos em momentos que vão moldar o futuro desta sociedade, serve-se recorrentemente de prosas deste calibre: «amor à Pátria e amor a Macau, de corpo e alma, têm sido uma tradição por excelência dos residentes da Região. Após o retorno à Pátria, o espírito deste amor transformou-se numa força motriz para a construção e o desenvolvimento da Região, configurando-se uma noção comum em que compete à RAEM o cumprimento da missão de defesa da segurança nacional» (ou outra missão qualquer, dependendo da circunstância).
Por favor, censurem-nos!

O artigo 23 na TDM

Videonotícias da TDM e programas da Rádio Macau sobre a regulamentação do artigo 23.º da Lei Básica:

• Debate na Rádio Macau em 8 de Novembro
• Telejornal de 8 de Novembro (debate da Rádio Macau)
• Telejornal de 23 de Novembro (carta da ANMD)
• Telejornal de 23 de Novembro (manifestação)
• Telejornal de 24 de Novembro (Au Kam San na AL)
• Telejornal de 27 de Novembro (debate do Hoje Macau)
• Telejornal de 28 de Novembro (Associação dos Advogados)
• Telejornal de 29 de Novembro (debate da ANMD)
• Telejornal de 30 de Novembro (final da consulta pública)

Esta lista será actualizada sempre que estiverem disponíveis mais videonotícias no sítio da TDM na Internet.

E agora?

Nuno Lima Bastos

Jornal Tribuna de Macau

4 de Dezembro de 2008

E pronto, terminou no domingo passado o prazo de quarenta dias que o Governo de Macau deu aos seus concidadãos para se pronunciarem sobre o projecto de «Lei relativa à defesa da segurança do Estado». Continuo a entender que foi incompreensivelmente curto, em especial pela importância das matérias envolvidas. Se normas penais que podem atirar uma pessoa para o calabouço durante 25 anos e vedar-lhe o exercício de funções públicas por outros vinte – na prática, “matando-a” politicamente – só merecem quarenta dias de reflexão pública, então não sei mesmo o que é importante para os nossos governantes e para os políticos, dirigentes associativos e opinadores que consideraram desnecessário o alargamento da fase de consulta pública ou até se lhe opuseram.
Na sua recente passagem por Macau, Leung Kwok-hung, o polémico deputado do Legislative Council de Hong Kong mais conhecido por Long Hair, recordou que os habitantes da sua região administrativa especial só começaram verdadeiramente a reagir contra a prevista regulamentação do artigo 23.º da Lei Básica cerca de três meses após o projecto de Tung Chee Hwa ter visto a luz do dia. E assim sucedeu, de facto: o articulado foi apresentado em 24 de Setembro de 2002 e a sua primeira contestação nas ruas deu-se a 15 de Dezembro, num crescendo que culminou com a mega-manifestação de 1 de Julho seguinte. Afinal, e apesar de o documento de consulta do projecto de Macau não fazer, estranhamente, uma única referência ao frustrado processo legislativo de Hong Kong, talvez o nosso Executivo tenha mesmo tido em conta a malfadada experiência vizinha quando estabeleceu este apertado prazo entre nós... Foi isso que insinuou o Long Hair e tenho para mim que não andará longe da verdade, por muitas sondagens que andem por aí a “encomendar” aos kaifong e a outros.
Quanto às sugestões e comentários enviados para a página na Internet criada para o efeito pelo Governo, continuamos sem saber, no momento em que escrevo esta crónica, o que sucedeu no último dia de consulta, 30 de Novembro. Presumo que tenham, literalmente, “chovido” os contributos, uma vez que três dias úteis não foram ainda suficientes para a sua divulgação. A minha apressadíssima prestação (confesso) foi enviada a três minutos da deadline e sei de outros casos semelhantes. Esperemos, pois, que tudo seja tornado público até ao final desta semana.
Depois, haverá que aguardar (im)pacientemente pelo texto que vai dar entrada na Assembleia Legislativa. E será então que poderemos avaliar com maior justeza da boa fé dos nossos dirigentes quando decidiram levar a cabo a consulta pública. É que é relativamente fácil produzir um documento como aquele livrinho verde, imbuído de uma linguagem patriótica espúria em vez de aprofundar as explicações técnicas, organizar umas sessões públicas sujeitas a marcação obrigatória de lugar com uma semana de antecedência – até para intervir, Santo Deus! –, divulgar num website as notícias saídas nos jornais e os comentários recebidos, introduzir duas ou três alterações mínimas ao projecto original, enviá-lo para um hemiciclo com a composição e o registo passado que todos conhecemos e, no fim de tudo, reclamar os louros de um processo supostamente muito participativo, onde toda a gente pôde intervir e todos os contributos válidos foram devidamente ponderados... Espero estar redondamente enganado e ter que me vir retractar em breve. Fá-lo-ia com todo o prazer!
A terminar, uma justa palavra de reconhecimento para o meu amigo António Marques da Silva, o assessor da Secretária para a Administração e Justiça que tem a “batata quente” em mãos. Li a sua crónica na imprensa de ontem, onde falava de salamandras viscosas. Não sei a quem se referia – e sempre advoguei que, nestas coisas, devemos tratar os “bois” pelos nomes –, nem o que o terá levado a escrever palavras tão azedas. Posso e devo, no entanto, testemunhar a sua disponibilidade e abertura na discussão de tão sensível assunto em muitos momentos ao longo do último mês. Estivemos numa espécie de frente-a-frente na Rádio Macau numa altura em ainda mais ninguém parecia disponível para dar a cara – e que acredito ter servido, por isso, para motivar outras iniciativas e intervenções posteriores. Participou no debate organizado pelo Hoje Macau. Foi um dos dois oradores do debate promovido pela Associação dos Jornalistas de Língua Portuguesa e Inglesa de Macau. Em todas essas circunstâncias, dele discordei humildemente em diversas questões jurídicas e não tão humildemente em outras tantas questões políticas. Em todas essas situações, sempre reagiu com lealdade e genuíno empenho em contribuir para a clarificação e aperfeiçoamento das soluções legislativas, não obstante a sua muito ingrata posição profissional. Tivessem todos a mesma atitude e, certamente, muitas asneiras teriam sido evitadas ao longo desta primeira década de RAEM. Só lhe peço é que mantenha o mesmo empenho, porque a campanha está ainda a aquecer...

Notas: uma vez mais, agradeço ao Bairro do Oriente a menção desta crónica na sua rubrica «Leituras» da semana, assim como a recomendação feita à minha posta acima («O artigo 23 na TDM»). Aproveito, igualmente, para agradecer a referência do Exílio de Andarilho aO Protesto na sua posta «Pela Blogosfera».

A liberdade também se defende na rua...

(Hong Kong, 1 de Julho de 2003)

(Hong Kong, 9 de Julho de 2003)

Sondagens...

Segundo os resultados de um inquérito divulgado há dias pelos Kaifong, 92% dos residentes de Macau apoiam a iniciativa governamental de avançar com a «Lei de defesa da segurança do Estado». Partilho da estranheza do Bairro do Oriente em relação a este e outros números saídos daquele inquérito, ou não parecessem "cozinhados" à exacta medida das pretensões do Governo local.

Neste fórum da CTM, por exemplo, quase 75% das pessoas votaram contra a regulamentação do artigo 23.º da Lei Básica...

Os jornalistas de Hong Kong e o artigo 23

HKJA’s View on Enactment of Article 23 of the Macau Basic Law

The Macau SAR Government has introduced for public consultation a draft on the enactment of Article 23 of the Macau Basic Law or, more properly, the “Defense the National Security Law” (Draft).

The Hong Kong Journalists Association believes that whether or not the Macau legislature passes this Bill is of no relevance to Hong Kong and, therefore, should not be followed by the Hong Kong SAR Government in the foreseeable future. Following in the footsteps of Macau will only accentuate the differences within our community and sharpen conflicts at a time when Hong Kong is facing the global economic crisis. We believe that further divisions within our community will adversely affect revival of our economy.

We believe that there is no necessity to move in tandem with Macau on this issue. Both the Hong Kong and Macau Basic Laws specifically requires that each of the two Special Administrative Regions “should enact laws on its own”, neither “by them together” nor “at the same time”.

Additionally, the legal systems, the outlook and the interests of Hong Kong and Macau people are completely different. The process and timing of enactment of such a law for Hong Kong will have to be different as well.

The Hong Kong Journalists Association continues to hold the view, first expressed on 24 September 2002 that: “(It) views with regret the decision by the Government of the Hong Kong SAR to publish the consultation paper for the enactment of Basic Law Article 23. The HKJA has consistently held that there is no basis for rushing ahead with enactment, considering Hong Kong’s stable political environment and the absence of any threat to state security. Article 23 prohibits such acts as treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People’s government and the theft of state secrets. Secession and subversion are not considered crimes in Hong Kong and other common law jurisdictions. The introduction of these new concepts inevitably would adversely affect freedom of expression.”

To ensure adequate and continued freedom of expression and freedom of the press as well as continued protection of Macau correspondents of Hong Kong’s news media and Hong Kong reporters who may go to Macau for reporting purposes, it is our view that some revisions are necessary to the draft newly-released for public consultation by the Macau Government. For instance we believe there is a need to be more specific in Article 6 of the draft (theft of state secrets) by adding “national and public interest” as “reasonable excuse” or “reasonable immunity” to ensure a proper balance between the needs of national security and freedom of expression as well as freedom of the press.

Other articles and words need to be revised to, at least, include:

1. Proper definition of “publicly and directly” in Article 5 (prohibition of sedition);

2. Proper definition of “state secret” in Article 6 (prohibition of theft of state secret);

3. Proper definition of “preparation behavior” in Article 9 (preparation behavior);

4. More restriction to “not open trial” (secret trial) concerning criminal process of Article 6 and referred to again in Article 13.

Because Articles 141 to Article 176 of Portuguese “Code of Penalty” had lost their effect at Macau after Dec.20 of 1999, HKJA is not against the view that there is “necessity” to enact “Defense National Security Law” on its own in the legal system of Macau, but it is not a “pressing social need.” Therefore the Macau SAR government should allow more time than 40 days for broader and deeper consultation. Do not set a deadline to pass this bill at or before Dec.20 of 2009, but allow the general public more time for fuller consideration of the implications of such a bill.

(12/11/2008)